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Abstract
The paper estimates a social interactions model to study the im-
pact of culture on US immigrants’ decisions. Findings vary by group
of immigrants and by type of social interactions and they are ro-
bust to both additional checks and sensitivity analysis. The paper
contributes to the literature as follows. It first estimates a social
interactions model that models both group formation and the for-
mation of social interactions. Besides, since this is an observational
learning model policy suggestions may be drawn to favor integra-
tion of immigrants. Finally, it provides a new empirical strategy to
study the impact of both inherited and contemporaneous culture on
individual decisions.
∗Marini: University of Pennsylvania, 249 S 36th Street Philadelphia, PA19104,
marinia@sas.upenn.edu. I am very grateful to Steven Durlauf for his comments and
suggestions. The responsibility for the content of the paper is entirely mine. While
working at this paper I received financial support from the John Templeton Founda-
tion. The opinion expressed in this publication are mine and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the John Templeton Foundation. I have no relevant or material financial
interests that relate to the research described in this paper.
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“Everybody blames the culture without taking responsibility”,
J.L. Levine, American Musician
“Trusting is good but not trusting is better”, Italian Proverb
“In God we trust”, Statement on the American Bank Notes
1 Introduction
What are the factors that explain the sorting of immigrants in a region?
And once they decide to live in a region who, amongst them, trusts others
and what affects their behavioral decision? This paper analyzes the impact
of both social interactions and inherited trust on decisions of immigrants
living in the United States.
When individuals decide to move and migrate to a region of another
country they should also decide whether to conform to the behavior of
individuals living in the host region or to keep living in the new country
maintaining the behavior they used to have in the country of origin. The
decision of immigrants to integrate or to segregate themselves in the host
country may have socioeconomic consequences. On the one hand, the ability
of immigrants to integrate may have positive effects on economic behavior
and performance (Constant and Zimmermann, 2008). On the other hand,
after immigrants settle in a region they may stick to the behavior they used
to have in their country of origin, form their behavioral decision based more
on their interactions with other immigrants (cultural segregation) or adapt
to the behavior of a whole society (cultural assimilation). This may generate
social traps, which are the equivalent of poverty traps when dealing with
social outcomes.
The present paper aims at linking the migration literature (Mincer, 1978;
Dustmann, 1995, 1997, 2003; Kirdar, 2009; Gibson and McKenzie, 2011;
Kennan and Walker, 2013), with both the cultural economics literature
and the social interactions literature. In particular, we let US immigrants
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coming from various areas of the world first choose a low-trust (L-type)
or high-trust (H-type) US region (location decision) and then undertake
a behavioral decision (whether to trust others) conditional to the location
decision.
Existing studies on migration and trust behavior find that there are dif-
ferences in inherited trust of immigrants and their forebears coming from
countries with different trustworthiness levels and such differences may ex-
plain the causal impact of trust on economic growth (Algan and Cahuc,
2010); furthermore, Ljunge (2014) studies trust in children of immigrants
coming from about 90 different countries. The analysis shows that there
exists an intergenerational transmission in children, who show trust similar
to that of their mothers; he also finds that immigrants are more likely to
adapt to societies with low trustworthiness than to more trustworthy soci-
eties, confirming the findings of the previous literature according to which
depreciation of social capital is easy, while it is more difficult to build it
(Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). Dinesen and Hooghe (2010) using the Eu-
ropean Values Survey investigate whether there exists an acculturation of
trust of non-Western immigrants migrating to a Western country: they
find that acculturation takes place, especially in second-generation immi-
grants. Dinesen (2012a,b, 2013) and Ro¨der and Muhlau (2011) are other
examples concerning the analysis of trust in immigrants. Moschion and
Tabasso (2014) investigate the impact of both inherited culture and the
environment on trust of second-generation immigrants in the United States
and Australia and find that both the host and home country explain dif-
ferences in trust of immigrants. Following this literature, this study lets
immigrants’ location and behavioral decisions depend upon the difference
in trustworthiness existing between the host region and the country of ori-
gin to check whether and the extent to which difference in trustworthiness
is an important determinant of immigrants’ decisions.
The paper also links the migration literature to the social interactions
literature by allowing immigrants’ decisions to depend upon different kinds
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of social interactions. Indeed, there exist various studies in the social in-
teractions literature assessing the importance of social ties and networks
to explain the existence of segregation and social/poverty traps (Benabou,
1993, 1996; Durlauf, 1996; Brock and Durlauf, 2001a; Topa, 2001; Zanella,
2007). Drawing on this literature, the paper estimates a social interactions
model that models both the sorting of individuals into regions and the for-
mation of social interactions on trusting decisions. Besides, it investigates
the impact of various network relations on trust of immigrants by allow-
ing different specifications of the social interactions term. This estimation
framework is appealing because the parameter that measures the strength of
social interactions and its interplay with private utility may provide sugges-
tions about the possible presence of multiple equilibria and poverty/social
traps (e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001b, 2006). Also, the General Social Sur-
vey (GSS henceforth) data set used in the analysis, has information about
immigrants living in the United States and their nationality. Thus, by
studying sub-samples of immigrants the paper captures decision differences
across immigrants coming from various areas of the world.
The paper innovates with respect to the previous literature as follows.
First, it draws on the most recent advances of the social interactions lit-
erature in that immigrants’ decisions are estimated by a sequential logit
model. This permits to overcome the usual limits of the social interac-
tions models, namely, the self-selection problem and the reflection problem
(Manski, 1993; Zanella, 2007; Brock and Durlauf, 2006), through modeling.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first application of a social in-
teractions model that models the formation of both social interactions and
group membership. Thus, the paper is econometrically innovative because it
paves the way for future empirical work on social interactions. Besides, this
is an observational learning model (Manski, 2000), that is, a model where
individuals are influenced by other individuals’ beliefs and not by prefer-
ences. Thus, the empirical analysis may be useful to provide suggestions
for policy-makers because changes in expectations about other individuals’
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behavior could be induced and this could conduct a society out of a social
trap and favor integration of immigrants. Finally, the study is economically
innovative because it suggests a new empirical strategy to investigate the
impact of both the historical component of culture (i.e. via the difference
in levels of trustworthiness between the host region and the home country)
an its contemporaneous component (i.e. the social interactions term) on
immigrants’ location and behavioral decision to trust others.
Results suggest that both inherited trust and social interactions are
relevant to explain immigrants’ decisions. The social interactions terms
vary both among sub-samples of immigrants and type of social interactions.
Also, especially for sub-sample of immigrants coming from less trustworthy
areas, the findings support the existing literature according to which social
capital is easy to depreciate, but difficult to build (Nunn and Wantchekon,
2011; Ljunge, 2014).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reports the framework
and the data. Section 3 provides descriptive statistics and the estimation
results on the whole sample. Section 4 reports the simulations results ob-
tained using the sub-samples of immigrants. In section 5 a sensitivity and
robustness checks are provided; section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Empirical Framework
2.1 Data
The data come from both the WVS data set1 and the GSS data set. Trust
of immigrants is obtained from the GSS data set. The variable used is
the following: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” I derive
1The former version (2007) of the WVS data set has been used to obtain country
average trustworthiness measures because it is more complete than the latter version
(2014). This last version, the European Values Survey or interpolation have been used
to integrate the 2007 version of the WVS when needed.
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a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the immigrant answers that most
people can be trusted, 0 otherwise. By averaging this indicator for all the
individuals living in each region in each year of the GSS, I construct the
yearly average trustworthiness for each region, which is used in the analysis
as global interactions term catching the impact of global social interactions
on immigrants’ decisions. The second type of social interactions term used
in the analysis is the yearly average trust by immigrants living in the same
region and the third social interactions term is the yearly average trust
by immigrants coming from the same geographic area.2 These last two
terms have been constructed by averaging the indicator by, respectively,
immigrants and immigrants coming from the same region of the world living
in a same region.
Also, to get the difference in trustworthiness between the host region and
home country, the same question for trust in the WVS is used. This allows
to get the country of origin average trustworthiness. Since the wording of
the WVS is exactly the same as for the trust question in the GSS, we may
assume that the two sets of averages can be compared. Then, such average
values are subtracted by the yearly average values of the respective host
regions for each group of immigrants. This allows to obtain the difference
in trustworthiness between host region an home country.3 To decide which
region is considered as an L-type or an H-type region, the yearly average
trust across all the individuals living in a region is used: for each year the
overall average trust is computed and a region is considered to be an L-type
or an H-type region depending on whether the average trust of a region is
2Social interactions are defined global when individuals assign the same weight to the
other individuals of the group and they form their expectations on a large enough group
that they cannot assume to know and interact with every individual in the group (Brock
and Durlauf, 2001a). Thus, all our social interactions terms are likely to be global rather
than local, although the interactions with immigrants coming from the same geographical
area living in the host region may be assumed partly local due to strong ties that may
link such immigrants.
3Although the question is about trust, we assume that average trust can be considered
a measure for trustworthiness in a region, as assumed by the existing literature (e.g.
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2012).
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respectively lower or higher than the average trust in a given year. I reckon
that this is endogenously determined and may vary over time, but it is
exogenous for the location decision of immigrants who decide only after the
classification of a given region as L-type or H-type has occurred.
The construction of this variable limits the time framework of the anal-
ysis to the years available from the WVS: only the intermediate waves are
used, excluding the first one for lack of data and the last one because the
data was not available for all the countries of the sample. Thus, the GSS
sample refers to the years 1989-2012.
Finally, since the aim of the analysis is to investigate immigrants’ be-
havior, after the computation of regional averages for trust, non-immigrants
have been dropped. After excluding information on immigrants that did
not indicate a specific country, the following countries, representing im-
migrants coming from the economies worldwide, are left: Africa, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the United Kingdom,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mex-
ico, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico (dropped be-
cause not available in the WVS), Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, India,
Portugal, Lithuania, Yugoslavia, Romania and Americas. Given the small
number of immigrants per each country, in the analysis immigrants are
grouped according to macro-areas of origin (namely, Africa, Northern Eu-
rope, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia and Americas) to run the
sub-sample analysis. At the end of the sample restrictions imposed, the
data set that can be used for the regression analysis is composed of 2,067
immigrants. The list of variables, their source and definitions are reported
in Appendix I (Table A1).
2.2 Empirical Framework
The analysis is based on a model, described in Appendix II. Immigrants
choose a group/region (location decision) of the United States g ∈ (L,H),
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which can be categorized as L-type or H-type region, where L < H and L
and H respectively stand for low and high. Once they have chosen where
to migrate they make a behavioral decision by choosing a certain behavior
ω ∈ (Liω|g, Hiω|g).
The model is similar to the one in Brock and Durlauf (2006) and Zanella
(2007). As in their framework, the use of a nonlinear model and the two-
stages model allow to overcome the typical problems of the social interac-
tions models, namely, the reflection problem and the self-selection problem
(Manski, 1993, 2000; Blume and Durlauf, 2006). However, it differs from
their analysis in that I estimate a sequential logit model rather than a nested
logit model because it is more suitable to this framework (see Appendix II
for details).
The estimation strategy is as follows:
Prig=H = Λ
(
β10 + β11Xi + β12Yig + β13dtrigr + J1m
e
ig + β14u1 > 0
)
(1)
Priω|g=H = Λ
(
β20 + β21Xi + β22Yig + β23dtrigr + J2m
e
ig + β24u2 > 0|g = H
)
(2)
Priω|g=L = Λ
(
β30 + β31Xi + β32Yig + β33dtrigr + J3m
e
ig + β34u3 > 0|g = L
)
(3)
where Equation (1) indicates that individuals sort into either an H-type re-
gion or an L-type region, and equations (2) and (3) indicate the behavioral
decision undertaken by the immigrant sorting into respectively a H-type or
a L-type region. Both the location (g) and the behavioral (ω) decision are a
function of other variables that can be grouped as individual-specific char-
acteristics, Xi (i.e. immigrants’ age and its squared, education dummies
capturing whether the immigrant has less than 12 years of education or
more than 16 years of education, a dummy variable for married and single,
a dummy that catches if the immigrant is a full-time or a part-time worker,
and dummies for religion and race), group-specific characteristics, or con-
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textual effects, Yig (i.e. the average levels of education in the host region),
contemporaneous culture, meig (i.e. the yearly average level of trust of indi-
viduals belonging to the reference group the immigrants make expectations
about: individuals living in the host region or immigrants living in the host
region or immigrants living in the host region coming from the immigrant’s
geographic area), an error term and the term capturing the difference in
trustworthiness between the host region and home country, dtrigr, which is
ethnic-specific (r). By adding this term the paper follows the social capital
literature (Durlauf, 2002; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005).4
As conventional in social interactions models, self-consistency is assumed
to close the model; this implies that the immigrants’ expectations coincide
with the objective probability of the model, (meig = mig).
5 Also, Jg, mea-
sures the strength of social interactions and determines, jointly with both
the private and the random utility, the presence of multiple equilibria and
social traps arising from different herding behaviors of immigrants. Thus,
the presence of a sizeable J is a necessary condition for the existence of mul-
tiple equilibria. Finally, ud (d = 1, 2, 3) indicates the error term for each
equation. Following the literature (Train, 2003; Buis, 2011) in the estima-
4To avoid reverse causality and endogeneity problems, we assume that the difference
in trustworthiness is an objective indicator predetermined with respect to the location
decision taken by the immigrant. However, we also instrumented the difference in trust-
worthiness using as instruments the weighted genetic distance between the United States
and each ethnicity used by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) as well as the yearly family
income of the respondent when (s)he was 16 years old, averaged by ethnicity, obtained
from the GSS. Since the weighted genetic distance has an effect on economic develop-
ment (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009), we may assume that the weighted genetic distance
is correlated with and can be used to instrument the difference in trustworthiness; at
the same time we can assume it is not correlated with the error terms of individual
decisions. The same can be said for the other instrument. Then, a two-step procedure is
applied: the sequential logit is run by adding the estimated residual from the regression
as additional regressor (Heckman, 1979) and standard errors have been bootstrapped.
The results do not significantly change.
5I empirically compute the social interactions terms as the average level of trust of
the reference group. By doing this, I assume that, for the law of large numbers, the
average computed on all the individuals and the average computed on all the individuals
but the immigrant making expectations do not differ.
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tion I control for endogeneity of the social interactions terms by means of
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity correlated with it; I assume that
it is normally distributed with standard deviation (σ) equal to 1. Since
we can think at unobserved heterogeneity as a weighted sum of all the un-
observed variables that are possibly correlated with the social interactions
term, the distributional assumption is reasonable. Given the distributional
assumption on unobserved heterogeneity, the models are estimated using
simulated maximum likelihood due to the impossibility to get a close form
solution (Train, 2003; Buis, 2011). Also, I assume, as baseline scenario,
that the correlation (ρ) of unobserved heterogeneity with the variable of in-
terest is 0.25. The correlation is intentionally chosen not too high because
the unobserved variables may have either a positive or negative correlation
with the variable of interest. Thus, assuming positive but not too high cor-
relation seems a natural choice. A sensitivity analysis is provided in Table
12.
3 Estimation Results
3.1 Actual Data
In Table 1 trust averages of immigrants by country are reported. In this
table the entire GSS sample (1972-2012) has been used to get more obser-
vations for each ethnicity. For each area and sub-population the average
trust of immigrants sorting in either an L-type (left column) or in an H-
type (right column) region is reported. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Withney test
indicates that only for some countries average trust of immigrants in L and
H-type regions differ. However, the Kruskal-Wallis tests show that we can
reject the null hypothesis of equal means across both areas of the world and
countries. Although not much can be inferred from the table due to data
limitations and because we cannot compare trust of immigrants before and
after migration, immigrants coming from the same place in L-type regions
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have overall lower trust than immigrants from the same area in H-type re-
gions. Also, overall, trust is higher for immigrants coming from trustworthy
societies. This is a preliminary descriptive evidence that trust of immigrants
may be influenced by both inherited trust and social interactions.
Table 1: Sorting of immigrants in US regions
L-type H-type L-type H-type
regions regions regions regions
Country of origin Average trust Country of origin Average Trust
South America 0.088* 0.154* Poland 0.231 0.424
Africa 0.219 0.250 Russia 0.474 0.486
North Europe 0.391** 0.489** Lithuania 0.000 0.333
Austria 0.400 0.300 Ex-Yugoslavia 0.500 0.500
Denmark 0.333 0.400 Romania 0.300 0.143
UK 0.465 0.506 Asia 0.367 0.371
Finland na 1.000 China 0.394 0.492
Germany 0.265** 0.453** Japan 0.462 0.421
Ireland 0.464 0.375 Philippines 0.216 0.193
Netherlands 0.429 0.467 India 0.429 0.393
Norway 0.500 0.615 North America 0.310 0.238
Sweden 0.571 0.714 South Europe 0.267 0.340
Switzerland 1.000 na Greece 0.300 0.400
Belgium 1.000 1.000 France 0.455 0.471
East Europe 0.351 0.432 Italy 0.259 0.366
Czechoslovakia 0.167 0.500 Spain 0.270 0.214
Hungary 0.625 0.429 Portugal 0.000* 0.300*
Kruskal-Wallis test χ26 = 72.708 [0.000] χ
2+
6 = 112.221 [0.000]
(by area)
Kruskal-Wallis test χ232 = 111.347 [0.000] χ
2+
32 = 171.859 [0.000]
(by country)
Notes: Averages by immigrants sorting in low or high trust regions are reported. Low
and high trust regions are defined with respect to the yearly average level of trust. Every
pair of averages for immigrants sorting in low and high trusting regions has been tested
to check for significant differences using a two-sample Wilcoxon ranksum Mann-Whitney
test. + indicates the Kruskal-Wallis (KW) statistics corrected for ties, p-values for the
KW statistics are in []. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *
Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey, years 1972-2012.
To check this further, a sequential logit model is estimated. From now
onward the time span of the analysis is restricted to the years 1989-2012.
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The estimation results on the whole sample always include a time dummy
for the years before and after 2000; this time dummy is not included in the
sub-sample analysis because due to data limitations it was impossible to get
results for some of the groups of immigrants. Thus, for sake of comparison
it has been excluded from all the sub-sample regressions. This does not
affect the final results. The regression analysis is similar to the empirical
framework in Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), who analyze who trusts others
in the United States; however, this paper differs somehow from their analy-
sis. Indeed, this work focuses only on immigrants; also, it does not account
for the presence of past traumas and for the logarithm of the respondent
income to avoid loss of data and representativeness. Regression results in-
cluding the logarithm of income have been run, but it does not significantly
influence the decisions of immigrants, so its omission does not alter the
results. Finally, this paper controls for the social interactions term as well
as for the difference in trustworthiness between the host region and home
country to catch the impact of both inherited trust and contemporaneous
culture on the decisions of immigrants. In all the regressions the marginal
probabilities computed at the means for the location decision and the be-
havioral decision in L-type and H-type regions are reported respectively in
Columns (1), (3) and (5); while columns (2), (4) and (6) report relative
standard errors robust to the heteroskedasticity. Table A2 (in Appendix
I) shows the results for the sequential logit model on actual data; instead,
Table 2 shows the results on the whole sample using simulated data, that
is, using a data set whose variables have the same distribution and mo-
ments of the actual variables. Regional and ethnic representativeness of
immigrants is maintained, but the number of immigrants is increased to
get consistent results and to allow sub-sample analysis. For sake of brevity
only the results in Table 2 are commented because this is the whole sample
that should be related to the sub-sample analysis of the following Tables
and because these results are more consistent than the results in Table A2.
Also, the behavioral decisions of immigrants in L-type and H-type regions
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in sections 3.2. and 4 are commented together.
3.2 Simulations Results
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 report the results for the location decision
of immigrants. Females are less likely to emigrate to an H-type region than
men. Immigrants with lower education (i.e. less than 12 years) are more
likely to migrate to an H-type region than immigrants with intermediate
levels of education (the reference group). On average education levels are
higher in H-type regions. Both married and single are more likely to sort
themselves (compared to other marital status, i.e. divorced, widowed and
separated) in an H-type region. Immigrants who work both full-time and
part-time are less likely to sort themselves in a H-type region compared to
the ones having other working statues (i.e. retired, student, housekeeper,
-temporarily- unemployed). Blacks are less likely to join an H-type re-
gion than whites. Other races but blacks are more likely than whites to
sort themselves in an H-type region. Immigrants with religion affiliations
are less likely than immigrants with no religion to go living to an H-type
region. On average from the 2000 onward immigrants are more likely to
sort themselves in an H-type region. Immigrants coming from countries for
which the difference between trustworthiness of host region and home coun-
try is higher are more likely to sort in H-type regions: this indicates that
immigrants coming from countries with comparatively low trustworthiness
tend to migrate to regions with high trustworthiness. Finally, in H-type
regions the average trust is higher than in L-type regions.
The results for the behavioral decisions on trust of immigrants indi-
cate that females trust less than men, less educated immigrants are less
likely to trust than immigrants with intermediate levels of education, while
immigrants with higher levels of education (16 years or more) trust signif-
icantly more: this is an expected result in line with previous work (e.g.
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). Immigrants living in regions with higher
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Table 2: Simulations Results: Whole Sample and Global Social Interactions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age -0.00 (0.001) 0.00*** (0.001) 0.01*** (0.001)
age2 0.00 (0.000) -0.00 (0.000) -0.00*** (0.000)
female -0.12*** (0.008) -0.06*** (0.006) -0.06*** (0.005)
edu<12 0.04*** (0.009) -0.13*** (0.008) -0.16*** (0.007)
edu>16 -0.00 (0.010) 0.25*** (0.007) 0.24*** (0.007)
educavg 0.74*** (0.017) -0.09*** (0.009) -0.05*** (0.006)
married 0.08*** (0.010) 0.03*** (0.007) 0.04*** (0.006)
single 0.13*** (0.012) -0.03*** (0.009) -0.06*** (0.007)
ft -0.12*** (0.008) 0.06*** (0.006) 0.00 (0.005)
pt -0.07*** (0.012) 0.04*** (0.010) 0.05*** (0.008)
Black -0.05*** (0.017) -0.09*** (0.012) -0.07*** (0.011)
Other race 0.23*** (0.008) -0.09*** (0.006) -0.05*** (0.005)
Protestant -0.13*** (0.013) -0.10*** (0.009) 0.01 (0.007)
Catholic -0.12*** (0.012) -0.23*** (0.009) -0.14*** (0.007)
Jews -0.43*** (0.032) -0.07*** (0.018) 0.05*** (0.016)
Other religion -0.22*** (0.016) -0.03*** (0.011) 0.04*** (0.009)
2000 1.57*** (0.028) 0.16*** (0.008) -0.07*** (0.006)
dtr 0.46*** (0.028) -0.88*** (0.027) -0.61*** (0.019)
trustavg 42.99*** (0.715) 1.92*** (0.093) 0.51*** (0.059)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 84,841
log-pseudol -51,370.67
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for respectively immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions and their behavioral decision in H-type regions; columns
(2), (4) and (6) report the standard errors (in parenthesis) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the Delta Method and are robust to heteroskedas-
ticity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at
the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2012 and author’s
calculations.
levels of education are less likely to trust than immigrants living in regions
with lower levels of education. Married immigrants trust significantly more
than the reference group (i.e. divorced, separated or widowed), single ones
trust significantly less. In L-type regions full-time workers are more likely
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to trust than the reference group and part-time workers trust significantly
more than the reference group in both regions. Blacks and other races are
less likely to trust others than whites. Religious immigrants trust less than
immigrants with no religion affiliation in L-type regions; Jews and immi-
grants with other religions (Catholics) are more (less) likely to trust others
than immigrants with no religion in H-type regions. Since 2000 immigrants
sorting in H-type (L-type) regions are less (more) likely to trust than im-
migrants that joined H-type(L-type) regions before then. Immigrants for
which the difference between regional (i.e. host) and home trustworthiness
is bigger are less likely to trust others everywhere. This underlines the
skepticism of immigrants to conform to the new levels of trust if they come
from a comparatively (to the host region) low trustworthy country. Finally,
the higher the (expectation about) regional trust the higher the probability
that the immigrant will decide to trust others. This is the social interactions
term and its significance and size are important: immigrants are influenced
by their expectations about the collective beliefs on trust of the region in
which they sort themselves. Besides, the social interactions term is higher
than unity in L-type regions.
Overall, the results show that immigrants coming from countries with
comparatively (to the host region) lower trustworthiness are more likely to
sort in an H-type region; furthermore, immigrants coming from less trust-
worthy countries are less likely to trust others, indicating that trust inher-
ited from the home country influences trusting decisions in the host region.
Also, immigrants from the 2000 onward preferred to sort themselves in H-
type societies. The negative (positive) impact of the 2000 dummy on the
behavioral decision of immigrants in H-type (L-type) regions may be in-
terpreted as follows. In H-type regions, this result may catch the possible
effect of negative shocks that have occurred after the starting of the new
millennium (e.g. the 9/11 attack and the financial crisis) and that are likely
to have had a negative impact on individual trust. Interestingly, this effect
is opposite in L-type regions. This could be due, on the one hand, to the
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effect of globalization and information spread that could have increased the
probability for immigrants to trust others in the United States; on the other
hand, the negative international and US shocks mentioned before may have
affected more the trust of individuals in H-type regions than in L-type re-
gions because for instance individuals living in L-type regions may invest
less in the financial markets (see for instance Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales,
2004), so they have not been directly affected by the financial crisis, or be-
cause they are likely to live in regions of the United States far away from
where the attack took place. Finally, the social interactions term is always
significant, positive and high; this indicates that immigrants are overall in-
fluenced by the average trust of other individuals in a region, suggesting
overall cultural assimilation.
4 Sub-sample Analysis
Given the well known differences in trust across the populations of the
sample, it is worth performing a sub-sample analysis. Tables 3 to 8 report
the same analysis on immigrant population sub-samples, which spreads light
on differences in both sorting and trusting behavior of immigrants coming
from different areas of the world.
In Table 3 the results for the African sub-sample are reported. The
results for the location decision indicate that older African immigrants are
more likely to sort in H-type regions and females are less likely to sort in H-
type regions than males. Immigrants with either lower or higher education
are more likely to sort in an H-type region than the reference group. Average
education levels are higher in regions with high levels of trust. Singles are
more likely to sort in an H-type region than married or the reference group.
Full-time workers are less likely to migrate to an H-type region than part-
time workers or the reference group. Blacks and other races are more likely
than white Africans to sort in an H-type region. Protestants and Catholics
are more likely to go living in an H-type region than the Africans with
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Table 3: Simulations Results: Africans and Global Social Interactions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age 0.02*** (0.004) -0.01** (0.003) 0.00*** (0.000)
age2 -0.00*** (0.000) 0.00*** (0.000) -0.00*** (0.000)
female -0.10*** (0.023) -0.09*** (0.016) -0.00* (0.002)
edu<12 0.31*** (0.030) -0.04 (0.022) -0.01** (0.004)
edu>16 0.07** (0.028) 0.02 (0.022) 0.01** (0.003)
educavg 0.83*** (0.057) 0.18*** (0.026) -0.02*** (0.004)
married -0.02 (0.030) 0.02 (0.020) -0.01*** (0.004)
single 0.17*** (0.034) -0.09*** (0.026) -0.00 (0.003)
ft -0.05* (0.024) -0.10*** (0.017) -0.00 (0.002)
pt 0.04 (0.036) -0.14*** (0.030) -0.02*** (0.006)
Black 0.12*** (0.026) 0.08*** (0.019) 0.02*** (0.004)
Other race 0.24*** (0.030) -0.05** (0.020) 0.00 (0.003)
Protestant 0.15*** (0.037) 0.01 (0.023) 0.01** (0.004)
Catholic 0.09** (0.036) -0.17*** (0.024) 0.01* (0.004)
Jews -0.12 (0.081) -0.05 (0.049) 0.04** (0.015)
Other religion 0.02 (0.042) -0.09*** (0.029) 0.02*** (0.006)
dtr -1.56*** (0.334) -0.42 (0.305) -0.49*** (0.091)
trustavg 16.32*** (0.681) -0.14 (0.329) 0.85*** (0.142)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 5,017
log-pseudol. -2,964.61
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for respectively immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions and their behavioral decision in H-type regions; columns
(2), (4) and (6) report the standard errors (in parenthesis) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the Delta Method and are robust to heteroskedas-
ticity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at
the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2012 and author’s
calculations.
no religion. The higher the difference in trustworthiness between the host
region and the home country, the less likely that African immigrants sort
in H-type regions. The average trust is higher in H-type regions than in
L-type regions.
In columns (3) and (4) the results for the trust behavioral decision in
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L-type regions are reported, while columns (5) and (6) report Africans’ be-
havioral decision in H-type regions. Trust decreases (increases) with age
in L-type (H-type) regions. Females are less likely to trust than males in
both types of regions. In H-type regions African immigrants with lower ed-
ucation trust less than the reference group, the ones with higher education
trust more, as expected. The higher (lower) the average level of education
in L-type (H-type) regions, the more likely is they trust. Singles trust sig-
nificantly less than the African immigrants belonging to the reference group
in L-type region, while married trust significantly less than the reference
group in H-type regions. Full-time workers trust less than the reference
group in L-type regions and part-time workers trust significantly less than
the reference group in both L-type and H-type regions. Black Africans are
more likely to trust than white Africans in both L-type and H-type regions,
while other races are significant less likely (in L-type regions). Catholics and
immigrants with other religion in L-type (H-type) regions are less (more)
likely to trust than immigrants with no religion. Jews are more likely to
trust others than immigrants with no religion in H-type regions. The dif-
ference in trust and the social interactions term do not have a significant
effect on trusting decision of immigrants living in L-type regions. In H-type
regions the difference in trustworthiness negatively affects the probability
to trust others. The average trust has a positive and significant influence
on the probability to trust others.
In Table 4 the regression results for immigrants coming from Northern
European countries are reported. They show that (columns (1) and (2))
older Northern European immigrants are slightly less likely to sort in H-
type regions; females are less likely to sort themselves in a H-type region.
Immigrants with low levels of education are more likely than the immi-
grants with intermediate levels to go to an H-type region; also, average
education is higher in H-type regions. Married or single are more likely to
go living in an H-type region than immigrants with another marital sta-
tus. Northern European immigrants who work full-time are less likely to
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Table 4: Simulations Results: Northern Europeans and Global Social In-
teractions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age -0.01*** (0.003) 0.02*** (0.002) 0.01*** (0.002)
age2 0.00*** (0.000) -0.00*** (0.000) -0.00*** (0.000)
female -0.20*** (0.017) -0.03** (0.013) -0.04*** (0.012)
edu<12 0.19*** (0.021) -0.16*** (0.019) -0.23*** (0.017)
edu>16 0.04 (0.024) 0.31*** (0.016) 0.35*** (0.017)
educavg 1.35*** (0.029) -0.07*** (0.019) -0.03** (0.015)
married 0.08*** (0.022) 0.08*** (0.017) 0.10*** (0.015)
single 0.13*** (0.025) 0.03 (0.021) -0.10*** (0.019)
ft -0.12*** (0.018) 0.05*** (0.015) -0.4*** (0.013)
pt 0.00 (0.032) 0.11*** (0.023) 0.05** (0.020)
Black -0.00 (0.037) -0.32*** (0.031) -0.14*** (0.030)
Other race 0.38*** (0.020) -0.12*** (0.016) -0.11*** (0.015)
Protestant -0.13*** (0.027) -0.28*** (0.021) 0.05*** (0.017)
Catholic -0.03 (0.024) -0.37*** (0.021) -0.27*** (0.018)
Jews -0.96*** (0.059) -0.13*** (0.038) -0.20*** (0.047)
Other religion -0.14*** (0.032) -0.28*** (0.026) -0.01 (0.025)
dtr 0.41*** (0.086) -0.82*** (0.075) -0.46*** (0.050)
trustavg 28.69*** (0.498) 0.74*** (0.170) 1.00*** (0.148)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 19,165
log-pseudol -14,088.37
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for respectively immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions and their behavioral decision in H-type regions; columns
(2), (4) and (6) report the standard errors (in parenthesis) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the Delta Method and are robust to heteroskedas-
ticity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at
the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2012 and author’s
calculations.
go to an H-type region than the reference group; those of ethnicity other
than white and black are more likely to go to H-type regions. Northern
Europeans Protestants, Jews and those belonging to other religions are less
likely than Northern Europeans with no religion to sort themselves in an
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H-type region. The difference in trustworthiness positively and significantly
affects the sorting decision; furthermore, the average level of trust is higher
in H-type regions.
Regarding the trusting decision, trust of immigrants from Northern Eu-
ropean countries constantly increases with age, females are less likely to
trust than males, less educated trust less, more educated trust more than
those with intermediate levels of education. The lower the regional average
level of education, the higher the probability to trust. Married trust signif-
icantly more than the reference group and in H-type regions singles trust
less. Immigrants with a full-time work living in L-type (H-type) regions
are more (less) likely to trust others, part-time workers are more likely to
trust than the reference group everywhere. Northern Europeans that have
an ethnic background other than white are less likely to trust than white
Northern Europeans. Northern Europeans with religious affiliation are less
likely to trust than Northern Europeans with no religious affiliation in L-
type regions; Protestants in H-type regions are more likely to trust others
than Northern Europeans with no religious affiliation, instead Catholic and
Jews are less likely to trust others. In both types of regions, the higher the
difference in trustworthiness between host region and home country, the less
likely the immigrant will choose to trust (reluctance to adapt for the North-
ern European immigrants coming from regions/countries with comparative
lower trustworthiness); also, the social interactions term is positive, large
and significant. This may be due to the generally high-trust behavior and
adaptability of these countries.
Thus, immigrants coming from Northern European countries are very
influenced by both inherited and contemporaneous culture, and the im-
pact of social interactions is positive, significant in both L-type and H-type
regions.
Table 5 shows the results for the immigrants coming from the Southern
European countries. Females are less likely to sort in an H-type region than
males. Immigrants with high levels of education are less likely to sort in
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Table 5: Simulations Results: Southern Europeans and Global Social In-
teractions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age 0.00 (0.004) 0.01*** (0.003) 0.02*** (0.003)
age2 -0.00 (0.000) -0.00*** (0.000) -0.00*** (0.000)
female -0.19*** (0.020) -0.01 (0.014) -0.18*** (0.019)
edu<12 0.01 (0.022) -0.14*** (0.019) -0.14*** (0.024)
edu>16 -0.11*** (0.030) 0.16*** (0.018) 0.34*** (0.028)
educavg 0.70*** (0.062) 0.06*** (0.018) -0.45*** (0.023)
married 0.01 (0.025) 0.01 (0.016) 0.01 (0.023)
single -0.01 (0.027) -0.15*** (0.024) -0.08*** (0.030)
ft -0.04* (0.022) 0.07*** (0.016) 0.05** (0.021)
pt -0.03 (0.040) 0.13*** (0.026) 0.00 (0.034)
Black -0.14*** (0.050) -0.24*** (0.035) -0.15*** (0.049)
Other race 0.25*** (0.021) -0.19*** (0.017) 0.00 (0.022)
Protestant -0.29*** (0.034) -0.13*** (0.025) -0.06* (0.032)
Catholic -0.10*** (0.024) -0.23*** (0.022) -0.02 (0.028)
Jews -1.06*** (0.092) 0.03 (0.038) 0.01 (0.071)
Other religion -0.17*** (0.033) -0.18*** (0.030) 0.12*** (0.042)
dtr 2.23*** (0.237) -1.91*** (0.111) 0.18 (0.163)
trustavg 23.11*** (1.467) 2.06*** (0.211) -1.51*** (0.304)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 11,013
log-pseudol -6,676.34
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for respectively immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions and their behavioral decision in H-type regions; columns
(2), (4) and (6) report the standard errors (in parenthesis) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the Delta Method and are robust to heteroskedas-
ticity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at
the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2012 and author’s
calculations.
an H-type region than immigrants with intermediate levels of education.
Average education levels are higher in H-type regions. Full-time workers
are less likely to sort in H-type regions than the reference group. Southern
Europeans with ethnic background other than white and black are more
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likely to join an H-type region than whites, blacks are less likely. Religious
immigrants are less likely to sort in H-type regions than Southern Europeans
with no religious affiliation. The higher the difference in trustworthiness,
the more likely they are to migrate to an H-type region. The average level
of trust is higher in H-type regions.
As far as the behavioral decisions on trust are concerned, trust of im-
migrants from Southern European regions increases with age everywhere.
Females trust significantly less than males in H-type regions. Immigrants
with lower (higher) education are less (more) likely to trust than immi-
grants with intermediate education. The higher (lower) the average level of
education the more (less) likely it is that immigrants in L-types (H-types)
regions trust. Singles are less likely to trust than the reference group. Full-
time workers trust significantly more than the reference group everywhere;
part-time workers trust more in L-type regions. Blacks trust less than
whites and immigrants with other races trust less than whites in L-type
regions. Protestants, trust less than those with no religion; Catholics and
immigrants with other religious affiliation trust also less than immigrants
with no religion in L-type region, while immigrants with other religion trust
more in H-type regions. The higher the difference in trustworthiness the less
immigrants in L-type regions trust. Social interactions have a significant,
positive (negative) and large effect on the behavioral decision in L-type (H-
type) regions. The negative impact of the average trust in H-type regions
could indicate that immigrants from Southern European countries, which
are generally countries with low trustworthiness, could decide to trust less
in regions where they experience too high generalized trust. Skepticism and
the decision not to trust others may be the final result because they could
end up trusting more when they notice that other individuals living in the
host region have not too high levels of trust. This result is compatible with
other findings in the literature according to which individuals can easily
adapt to low levels of social capital, but they are less likely to conform to
high levels of social capital because social capital is difficult to build (Nunn
22
and Wantchekon, 2011; Ljunge, 2014).
Regarding immigrants coming from Eastern European countries (Table
6), their decision to sort in an H-type region is significantly affected by a
few variables. In particular, females are less likely to sort in an H-type
Table 6: Simulations Results: Eastern Europeans and Global Social Inter-
actions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age -0.00 (0.000) -0.01*** (0.003) 0.01*** (0.002)
age2 0.00 (0.000) 0.00*** (0.000) -0.00*** (0.000)
female -0.00* (0.000) -0.06*** (0.020) -0.07*** (0.014)
edu<12 0.00* (0.000) -0.12*** (0.026) -0.20*** (0.024)
edu>16 -0.00 (0.000) 0.27*** (0.028) 0.20*** (0.018)
educavg 0.01* (0.004) 0.21*** (0.040) 0.05*** (0.014)
married 0.00 (0.000) 0.01 (0.023) 0.06*** (0.018)
single 0.00 (0.000) 0.01 (0.032) -0.00 (0.022)
ft 0.00 (0.000) 0.03 (0.021) -0.04*** (0.015)
pt -0.00 (0.000) 0.00 (0.035) 0.05** (0.021)
Black -0.00* (0.000) -0.16*** (0.038) -0.23*** (0.039)
Other race 0.00* (0.001) -0.21*** (0.025) -0.07*** (0.015)
Protestant -0.00 (0.000) 0.01 (0.038) -0.04* (0.022)
Catholic 0.00 (0.000) 0.07** (0.036) -0.13*** (0.020)
Jews -0.00 (0.000) 0.20*** (0.054) 0.12*** (0.031)
Other religion -0.00 (0.000) 0.19*** (0.040) 0.01 (0.025)
dtr -0.00** (0.002) -1.21*** (0.201) -0.65*** (0.143)
trustavg 0.15** (0.076) -0.29 (0.320) 1.29*** (0.160)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 7,509
log-pseudol -4,603.85
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for respectively immigrants’ location decision, their be-
havioral decision in L-type regions and their behavioral decision in H-type regions;
columns (2), (4) and (6) report the standard errors (in parenthesis) for the respec-
tive choices. Standard errors are obtained using the Delta Method and are robust to
heteroskedasticity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *
Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2012 and author’s
calculations.
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region than males, immigrants with lower levels of education are slightly
more likely to sort in an H-type region than immigrants with intermediate
levels; average education is higher in H-type regions. Blacks are less likely
and other races are more likely to locate in an H-type region than whites.
Furthermore, immigrants coming from a Eastern European country with
a comparative larger difference in trustworthiness between the host region
and home country are more likely to sort themselves in an L-type region.
The average level of trust is higher in H-type regions.
Trust of Eastern European immigrants sorting in L-type (H-type) re-
gions decreases (increases) with age; females are less likely to trust than
men. Immigrants with lower (higher) education trust less (more) than im-
migrants with intermediate levels of education. The higher the average
level of education the more they trust. Married immigrants trust more
than the reference group in H-type regions. Immigrants working full-time
(part-time) trust less (more) than the reference group in H-type regions.
Both blacks and other races are less likely to trust than whites. Protestants
are less likely to trust than immigrants with no religion in H-type regions,
Catholics are more (less) likely to trust than the reference group in L-type
(H-type) regions. Jews are more likely to trust than the reference group
everywhere and immigrants belonging to other religions trust more than
immigrants with no religion in L-type regions. The higher the difference
in trustworthiness between host and home place the less likely they are to
trust others in both types of regions. The social interactions term has no
significant effect on the behavioral decision in L-type regions, but it has
a positive influence on the probability to trust for immigrants in H-type
regions.
Immigrants from Asia (results are shown in Table 7) are more likely to
join an H-type region if they are younger. Females are less likely to sort in
an H-type region than males. Asiatic immigrants with either low or high
levels of education are more likely to sort in a H-type region than the ones
with intermediate levels of education. Average education levels are higher
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in H-type regions. Both married and single immigrants are more likely to
sort in an H-type region than the reference group. Full-time workers are
less likely, part-time workers are more likely, to move to an H-type region
than the reference group. Asians with ethnic background other than white
and black are more likely to sort in H-type regions than white Asians,
blacks are less likely. Religious immigrants are less likely to sort in H-type
regions than Asiatic immigrants with no religion. The higher the difference
in trustworthiness the more likely they are to sort in H-type regions. The
average level of trust is higher in H-type regions.
Asians sorting in an L-type (H-type) region are slightly less (more) likely
to trust others if they are older; females in H-type regions are less likely to
trust others than males. Asians with higher (lower) education levels trust
significantly more (less) than immigrants with intermediate levels of edu-
cation; furthermore, the lower (higher) the average level of education, the
more (less) immigrants in L-type (H-type) regions are likely to trust oth-
ers. Single trust significantly less than the reference group. Both full-time
and part-time workers trust significantly more than the reference group.
Black Asians are less likely to trust than white Asians, other races in L-
type (H-type) regions are more (less) likely to trust than whites. Asians
with a religion affiliation are less likely to trust than Asians with no re-
ligion in L-type regions; instead, in H-type regions Catholic (immigrants
with other region) are less (more) likely to trust others than the reference
group. The higher the difference in trustworthiness the less they are likely
to trust others disregarding the type of region. The social interactions term
has a significant, negative and sizeable effect on the behavioral decision.
The results on the average trust for both behavioral decisions can be in-
terpreted as the results for Southern European immigrants. As a matter
of fact, Asiatic countries are endowed with relatively low trustworthiness
compared to the US regions. Thus, they may become skeptical when they
experience too high trust and may have counter-intuitive behaviors, such
as not to trust others if they notice that the average trust of individuals
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Table 7: Simulations Results: Asians and Global Social Interactions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age -0.01*** (0.001) -0.00** (0.002) 0.03*** (0.002)
age2 0.00*** (0.000) 0.00*** (0.000) -0.00*** (0.000)
female -0.08*** (0.007) 0.00 (0.013) -0.11*** (0.012)
edu<12 0.04*** (0.007) -0.05*** (0.016) -0.30*** (0.019)
edu>16 0.06*** (0.008) 0.32*** (0.018) 0.24*** (0.015)
educavg 0.40*** (0.019) -0.24*** (0.019) 0.05*** (0.014)
married 0.01** (0.007) 0.00 (0.017) -0.02 (0.016)
single 0.06*** (0.009) -0.08*** (0.021) -0.15*** (0.020)
ft -0.03*** (0.006) 0.12*** (0.015) 0.06*** (0.014)
pt 0.02* (0.011) 0.13*** (0.024) 0.11*** (0.019)
Black -0.14*** (0.019) -0.04* (0.026) -0.27*** (0.035)
Other race 0.07*** (0.007) 0.05*** (0.013) -0.04*** (0.013)
Protestant -0.08*** (0.011) -0.11*** (0.022) -0.02 (0.018)
Catholic -0.06*** (0.009) -0.18*** (0.021) -0.17*** (0.017)
Jews -0.17*** (0.031) -0.40*** (0.051) -0.01 (0.042)
Other religion -0.09*** (0.012) -0.06** (0.024) 0.04** (0.020)
dtr 0.22*** (0.024) -0.28*** (0.037) -0.74*** (0.036)
trustavg 9.88*** (0.458) -1.22*** (0.141) -1.34*** (0.169)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 17,798
log-pseudol. -13,394.86
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for respectively immigrants’ location decision, their be-
havioral decision in L-type regions and their behavioral decision in H-type regions;
columns (2), (4) and (6) report the standard errors (in parenthesis) for the respec-
tive choices. Standard errors are obtained using the Delta Method and are robust to
heteroskedasticity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *
Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2012 and author’s
calculations.
living in a region is too high.
Finally, Table 8 reports the results for American immigrants. Unfortu-
nately, Northern and Southern Americans had to be pulled together due to
data limitation, so this limits the possibility to disentangle the behavior of
these two types of immigrants; however, we control for a dummy variable
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Table 8: Simulations Results: Americas and Global Social Interactions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age -0.00* (0.000) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00*** (0.001)
age2 0.00 (0.000) 0.00 (0.000) -0.00 (0.000)
female -0.00* (0.000) -0.04*** (0.004) -0.08*** (0.007)
edu<12 0.00 (0.000) -0.03*** (0.005) -0.07*** (0.009)
edu>16 -0.00** (0.000) 0.05*** (0.005) 0.14*** (0.011)
educavg 0.00*** (0.000) -0.05*** (0.006) -0.08*** (0.011)
married 0.00* (0.000) 0.03*** (0.005) 0.08*** (0.010)
single 0.00 (0.000) 0.03*** (0.006) 0.03*** (0.011)
ft -0.00** (0.000) 0.01 (0.004) 0.06*** (0.008)
pt -0.00** (0.000) 0.00 (0.006) 0.06*** (0.012)
Afro-A. 0.00 (0.000) 0.04*** (0.008) -0.20*** (0.028)
Other race 0.00** (0.000) -0.01** (0.004) -0.03*** (0.007)
Protestant -0.00** (0.000) -0.02** (0.006) -0.01 (0.010)
Catholic -0.00** (0.000) -0.07*** (0.006) -0.08*** (0.010)
Jews -0.00 (0.000) -0.03** (0.014) 0.13*** (0.028)
Other rel. -0.00** (0.000) 0.04*** (0.007) 0.05*** (0.013)
South A. -0.00*** (0.000) -0.01 (0.010) 0.20*** (0.022)
dtr 0.01*** (0.003) -0.27*** (0.039) -1.28*** (0.100)
trustavg 0.02*** (0.006) 0.35*** (0.062) 0.80*** (0.063)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 24,339
log-pseudol. -9,434.04
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for respectively immigrants’ location decision, their be-
havioral decision in L-type regions and their behavioral decision in H-type regions;
columns (2), (4) and (6) report the standard errors (in parenthesis) for the respec-
tive choices. Standard errors are obtained using the Delta Method and are robust to
heteroskedasticity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *
Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2012 and author’s
calculations.
for Southern Americans. The results show that American immigrants are
influenced in their location decision mainly by the difference in trustwor-
thiness, which positively affects the decision of the immigrants to sort in a
H-type region, and by the region of provenience (Southern Americans are
less likely to sort in an H-type region). There are other significant vari-
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ables influencing the location decision, however, their impact is negligible
so comments are not provided.
As far as the behavioral decision is concerned, female American im-
migrants are less likely to trust than males; immigrants with less (more)
education are less (more) likely to trust than immigrants with intermediate
education. The higher the regional level of education the less likely it is that
they trust. Married and single trust significantly more than the reference
group. Both full-time and part-time workers are more likely to trust others
than the reference group in H-type regions. Other races trust less than
whites and Afro-Americans in L-type (H-type) regions trust more (less)
than whites. Protestants, Catholics and Jews are less likely to trust and
immigrants with other religions are more likely to trust than those with no
religion in L-type regions; Catholic (Jews and immigrants with other reli-
gion) are less (more) likely to trust others than immigrants with no religion
in H-type regions. The higher the difference in trustworthiness the less they
are likely to trust. Social interactions have a significant, positive and large
effect on the behavioral decision in both types of region.
Thus, American immigrants coming from regions with comparative low
trustworthiness are more likely to join an H-type region; both Americans
sorting in L-type and H-type regions are less likely to trust if they come
from a region with comparative lower trustworthiness and are influenced by
the average trust of other individuals living in the region.
5 Alternative Measures of Social Interactions
and Robustness Checks
5.1 Alternative Measures of Social Interactions
So far we have assumed that immigrants are influenced only by what they
think is the average collective trust of all the individuals living in their
28
region. Nonetheless, it is often the case that immigrants interact with other
immigrants and base their decision of whether to trust on collective beliefs
of other immigrants rather than on overall regional collective beliefs. This
is more realistic and possibly even more realistic is letting their behavioral
decision depend upon what they think is the average collective belief of
the immigrants living in their region coming from their same area of the
world (e.g. it is likely that immigrants coming from Southern Europe are
likely to be influenced by the average trust of other Southern European
immigrants living in their region). We thus replicate the analysis of Tables
2-8 keeping as social interactions term either the yearly average collective
belief of the immigrants living in the region (Table 9) or the yearly average
collective belief of the immigrants coming from the same region of the world
living in the region (Table 10), which can both represent the propensity of
immigrants to cultural segregation. For the sake of exposition, I only report
and comment the results for the difference in trustworthiness and the social
interactions terms for the three transitions because they are the variables
of greater interest.
Both Table 9 and 10 show that, disregarding the sample analyzed,6 both
the difference in trustworthiness and the average trust of immigrants have a
significant impact on the location decision, indicating that when differences
in trustworthiness are higher immigrants prefer to sort in H-type regions.
Most of the social interactions terms are positive and this indicates that
the average trust of immigrants (Table 9) and similar immigrants (Table
10) is higher in H-type regions; only for Eastern Europeans and Asiatic
immigrants the negative sign of contemporaneous culture indicates that
average trust of similar immigrants (Table 10) is lower in H-type regions.
As far as the location decisions are concerned, findings in Table 9 and 10
are similar. Overall (whole sample) immigrants are strongly, positively and
6This is true with the exception of Americans in Table 9 and Northern Europeans
in Table 10 for which trust of (similar) immigrants does not significantly impact the
location decision.
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Table 9: Simulations: All samples and Immigrants Social Interactions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Whole Sample
dtr 1.54*** (0.022) -0.68*** (0.023) -0.37*** (0.017)
trustimmig 0.29*** (0.018) 1.18*** (0.023) 0.69*** (0.014)
Africa
dtr 9.88*** (0.280) -0.82*** (0.113) 0.23*** (0.061)
trustimmig 0.88*** (0.066) 1.76*** (0.120) 0.30*** (0.037)
Northern Europe
dtr 1.58*** (0.048) -0.90*** (0.081) -0.37*** (0.049)
trustimmig 0.14*** (0.030) 1.77*** (0.053) 1.54*** (0.046)
Southern Europe
dtr 7.13*** (0.132) -1.23*** (0.100) 0.21** (0.098)
trustimmig 0.62*** (0.056) 1.24*** (0.065) 0.50*** (0.035)
Eastern Europe
dtr 7.43*** (0.190) -0.81*** (0.184) 0.58*** (0.091)
trustimmig 0.93*** (0.075) 0.33*** (0.119) 0.70*** (0.035)
Asia
dtr 0.63*** (0.028) -0.29*** (0.044) -0.51*** (0.031)
trustimmig 0.12*** (0.035) 0.69*** (0.050) 0.45*** (0.044)
Americas
dtr 8.72*** (0.135) 0.01 (0.032) -0.93*** (0.087)
trustimmig -0.05 (0.055) 0.22*** (0.015) 0.48*** (0.033)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.25
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for respectively immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions and their behavioral decision in H-type regions; columns
(2), (4) and (6) report the standard errors (in parenthesis) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the Delta Method and are robust to heteroskedastic-
ity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the
10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2012 and author’s
calculations.
significantly influenced by the trust of other (similar) immigrants living in
their region in both H-type and L-type regions. As in Table 2, also in this
case the difference in trustworthiness has a negative impact on immigrants’
trust.
With regards to the sub-sample analysis, African immigrants sorting in
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either L-type or H-type regions are significantly and positively influenced
by the trust of other (similar) immigrants living in the region. The impact
of the social interactions term in L-type regions in Table 9 is high; instead,
in Table 10 is much lower, indicating that while African immigrants are
very strongly influenced by the average trust of other immigrants in L-
type regions, the influence of other African immigrants on their trusting
decision is positive and significant but not very high. Also, the difference
in trustworthiness between the host region and the country of origin has
a negative (positive) impact on the probability to trust others in L-type
(H-type) regions when assuming that their trusting decision is influenced
by other immigrants collective trust (Table 9). Thus, we can conclude that
African immigrants in L-type regions are more willing to trust and conform
to the average trust of immigrants rather than the average trust of all the
individuals living in a region.
For Northern European immigrants the results in Tables 9, 10 and 4 are
qualitatively similar and indicate that the lower the difference in trustwor-
thiness the higher is the probability to trust others, and that immigrants
coming from Northern European countries are significantly, strongly and
positively affected by the average trust of (similar) immigrants in the host
region.
Immigrants coming from Southern European countries in Table 9 sort-
ing in L-type regions are more likely to trust others if they come from a
country with smaller difference in trustworthiness with the host US region,
as it was in Table 5; the opposite is true for immigrants in H-type regions.
The result for H-type regions is confirmed when we assume they are influ-
enced by other Southern European immigrants (Table 10). In both Tables
they are likely to be significantly and positively influenced by the average
trust of other immigrants in the region. It should be noticed that, compared
with Table 5, both social interactions terms in Tables 9 and 10 have a posi-
tive and significant influence on the behavioral decision, meaning that they
(especially immigrants in H-type regions) are more positively influenced by
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other (similar) immigrants rather than by the whole population.
Table 10: Simulations: All samples and Similar Immigrants Social Interac-
tions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Whole Sample
dtr 1.63*** (0.022) -0.27*** (0.025) -0.17*** (0.014)
trustworld 0.07*** (0.009) 1.20*** (0.017) 0.76*** (0.011)
Africa
dtr 10.72*** (0.282) -0.01 (0.024) -0.05 (0.085)
trustworld 0.30*** (0.034) 0.15*** (0.029) 0.31*** (0.085)
Northern Europe
dtr 1.60*** (0.048) -1.38*** (0.092) -0.46*** (0.053)
trustworld -0.03 (0.017) 1.77*** (0.038) 1.37*** (0.031)
Southern Europe
dtr 7.78*** (0.151) 0.04 (0.143) 0.35*** (0.063)
trustworld 0.31*** (0.032) 1.13*** (0.046) 0.84*** (0.053)
Eastern Europe
dtr 7.27*** (0.187) -0.99*** (0.125) -2.82*** (0.332)
trustworld -0.25*** (0.029) 1.44*** (0.098) 1.65*** (0.117)
Asia
dtr 0.61*** (0.027) -0.61*** (0.056) -0.57*** (0.038)
trustworld -0.05*** (0.019) 1.71*** (0.045) 1.34*** (0.044)
Americas
dtr 9.19*** (0.146) 0.33*** (0.064) -0.22*** (0.055)
trustworld 0.57*** (0.024) 0.66*** (0.039) 0.52*** (0.034)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.25
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for respectively immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions and their behavioral decision in H-type regions; columns
(2), (4) and (6) report the standard errors (in parenthesis) for the respective choices. Stan-
dard errors are obtained using the Delta Method and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***
Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2012 and author’s
calculations.
Eastern Europeans sorting in an L-type region are negatively influenced
in both Table 9 and 10 in their behavior by the difference in trustworthiness
between the host region and home country and they are positively and
significantly affected in their decision by the average trust of other (similar)
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immigrants living in their region. Eastern European immigrants in H-type
regions are also positively and significantly influenced by other (similar)
immigrants in the region; the difference in trustworthiness has a positive
(negative) impact when they are influenced by other immigrants (similar
immigrants). Comparing the results in Tables 6, 9 and 10 we may conclude
that Eastern European immigrants are more willing (especially in L-type
regions) to trust and conform to the average trust of immigrants rather
than the average trust of all the individuals living in a region.
Trusting decisions of Asian immigrants are both positively and signifi-
cantly influenced by (their expectations about) the average trust of other
(similar) immigrants in a region and negatively influenced by the difference
in trustworthiness between host and home place. Thus, comparing Tables
7, 9 and 10 we can conclude that Asiatic immigrants have counter-intuitive
behavior when they base expectations on the average trust of individuals
living in a region; on the contrary, they are more willing to conform to the
average behavior of immigrants and even more so when the social interac-
tions term is represented by other Asians living in their region. A similar
behavior is undertaken by Southern Europeans.
Finally, the behavior of American immigrants in H-type regions is simi-
lar in Tables 8, 9 and 10: they are positively influenced by the average trust
and negatively influenced by the difference in trustworthiness disregarding
the type of social interactions. With regards to L-type regions, the impact
of differences in trustworthiness is negative, positive and insignificant, re-
spectively, in Table 8, 10 and 9. The social interactions terms are significant
and positive everywhere.
5.2 Sample Representativeness
We now perform robustness checks. The first check (reported in Table 11)
concerns the structure of the GSS data. It could be argued that the GSS
data set became representative of the US population since 2006, when Span-
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Table 11: Simulations: Robustness Checks (Whole Sample)-
Representativeness
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(2002-2012)
dtr 0.00 (0.007) -1.10*** (0.042) -0.59*** (0.023)
trustavg 10.06*** (0.740) 2.53*** (0.167) 0.47*** (0.072)
(2002-2012)
dtr 1.68*** (0.034) -0.72*** (0.025) -0.50*** (0.022)
trustimmig -1.29*** (0.040) 0.79*** (0.033) 0.89*** (0.032)
(2006-2012)
dtr 1.67*** (0.041) -0.76*** (0.030) -0.76*** (0.031)
trustimmig -1.43*** (0.041) 0.69*** (0.038) 1.20*** (0.051)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.25
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for respectively immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions and their behavioral decision in H-type regions; columns
(2), (4) and (6) report the standard errors (in parenthesis) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the Delta Method and are robust to heteroskedas-
ticity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at
the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 2002-2012 and author’s
calculations.
ish speakers also started to be interviewed and included in the sample. This
could put into question the results obtained in the analysis. For this reason,
we run the same analysis on the sample from 2006 to 2012 to check whether
the social interactions terms maintain their significance. Unfortunately, the
scarce variability of the regional indicators does not allow to obtain results
for the regressions in which immigrants are influenced by the average trust
of other individuals living in their region (first definition of the social in-
teractions term). The regression using this definition is feasible only when
we include the years from 2002 onward. Thus, we repeat the empirical
analysis in Table 2 on the reduced sample (2002-2012). The regression on
the representative sample (2006-2012), however, can be run when the social
interactions term is the average trust of immigrants. Hence, we report the
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results for both the reduced samples (2002-2012 and 2006-2012) using this
definition. They show that the social interactions terms are still strongly
significant so we may conclude that as far as the significance of the social
interactions terms is concerned the whole sample is not significantly differ-
ent from the representative sample. The significance and the importance of
the social interactions terms are maintained, so we can conclude that the
survey composition did not qualitatively alter the results.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Finally, a sensitivity analysis is performed. The models estimated so far as-
sume a positive and intermediate level (0.25) of correlation (ρ) between un-
observed heterogeneity and the social interactions term and that unobserved
heterogeneity has standard deviation (σ) equal to 1. To check whether the
estimation results are biased due to the presence of unobserved heterogene-
ity we perform a sensitivity analysis. Indeed, the presence of unobservables
may give rise to two phenomena, namely, the averaging mechanism and the
selection mechanism, arising from the necessity to model a stylized discrete
model.7 We then estimate the models using different degrees of correlation
between unobservables and the regressors (Buis, 2011), as well as assuming
different standard deviations for the variable correlated with the social in-
teractions term. If the estimation results were sensitive, then the presence
of unobserved heterogeneity would be a problem and would alter the results,
7The averaging mechanism refers to the fact that estimating a model without mod-
eling the presence of unobserved heterogeneity is problematic because in a non-linear
model the impact of the regressors on the averaged probability differ from their impact
on the probability (Cameron and Heckman, 1998; Allison, 1999) We then estimate the
models using different degrees of correlation between unobservables and the regressor
(Buis, 2011), as well as assuming different standard deviations for the variable corre-
lated with the social interactions term. The selection mechanism, instead, refers to the
possibility that a variable that is not problematic in the first transition can become a
confounding variable from the second transition due to the self-selection process (Mare,
2000; Cameron and Heckman, 1998), since the decision modeled is the final outcome of a
dynamic process influenced by factors that could enter the results but are omitted from
the empirical model.
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and in this case the sensitivity analysis could be useful for understanding
which is the source of the problem. If the results were not sensitive to
changing the scenarios then we could conclude that the presence of unob-
served heterogeneity is not a problem, as indicated by previous studies (e.g.
Cameron and Heckman, 1998), for our framework.
Table 12: Sensitivity Analysis: Whole Sample and Global Social Interac-
tions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
σud = 0.5 ρ = 0.25
dtr 0.43*** (0.027) -0.79*** (0.024) -0.61*** (0.018)
trustavg 42.48*** (0.602) 1.74*** (0.081) 0.63*** (0.059)
σud = 0 ρ = 0.25
dtr 0.42*** (0.027) -0.76*** (0.023) -0.60*** (0.018)
trustavg 42.37*** (0.566) 1.90*** (0.078) 0.89*** (0.058)
σud = 1 ρ = 0.20
dtr 0.46*** (0.028) -0.88*** (0.027) -0.60*** (0.019)
trustavg 43.11*** (0.721) 2.08*** (0.094) 0.63*** (0.058)
σud = 1 ρ = 0.30
dtr 0.46*** (0.028) -0.88*** (0.027) -0.61*** (0.019)
trustavg 42.87*** (0.709) 1.76*** (0.091) 0.38*** (0.060)
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report
the marginal effects at the mean for respectively immigrants’ location decision,
their behavioral decision in L-type regions and their behavioral decision in H-
type regions; columns (2), (4) and (6) report the standard errors (in parenthe-
sis) for the respective choices. Standard errors are obtained using the Delta
Method and are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** Significant at the 1% level,
** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2012 and
author’s calculations.
Then the model is re-estimated assuming alternative scenarios presented
in Table 12. Thus, assuming that the unobserved heterogeneity would rep-
resent e.g. the transmission of cultural values from parents to children and
the individual willingness to pay for public goods, estimating the model with
0.2 and 0.3 implies that we are considering both individuals and societies
with low cultural endowment as well as individuals with high willingness to
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pay and highly culturally endowed countries and regions. The results are
not qualitatively sensitive to changing scenarios so we can conclude that
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity is not a problem for the analy-
sis. At this point it is important to remark that although by performing a
sensitivity analysis findings suggest that it does not alter the results, the
cross-sectional empirical framework analyzed here is somehow still subject
to the critique by Cameron and Heckman (1998), according to which single
decisions taken at a certain point (e.g. the location decision and the be-
havioral decision) are the outcome of previous experience: thus, although
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity may take this into account, in this
paper it is not possible to identify either all the historical reasons that
drive immigrants’ decisions (e.g. the influences of family ties and networks
in their home country), or to check whether their behavioral decision is
actually different from the behavior they used to take in their own country.
This is beyond the scope of the present work, but it could be investigated
using a panel of immigrants.
6 Conclusions
Using a sample of immigrants living in the Unites States, the paper ad-
dresses the importance of both inherited trust and social interactions to
explain immigrants’ decisions to trust others. By doing this, the paper pro-
vides a new empirical framework to study the relevance of social interactions
in individual decisions.
The findings suggest that overall immigrants are very influenced by both
their inherited trust and social interactions, showing that both historical
component of culture (via differences in trustworthiness between host and
home place) and the contemporaneous component of culture (i.e. social
interactions) are important to explain individual behavior. The results
vary by sub-sample of immigrants and sometimes they differ between the
immigrants sorting in H-type and L-type regions, indicating that the impact
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of social interactions may vary depending on both the ethnicity and the
sorting decision.
Alternative measures of social interactions are used and results show
that immigrants are likely to be influenced in a different way when their
expectations are formed using different network ties. This is important
because it suggests that different policies should be implemented, for in-
stance, to promote integration and a more trusting behavior of different
ethnic groups. The findings are robust to additional checks and to a sensi-
tivity analysis.
Policies aimed at changing immigrants’ expectations (via interventions
on the social interactions term, components of Xi and/or Yig) may help a
society to prevent segregation and to favor integration.
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A Appendix I
Table A1 reports the list of variables, definitions and sources.
Table A1: List of Variables, Definitions and Source
Variables Definition Source
age age of respondent (r henceforth) GSS
age2 age of r squared GSS
female dummy variable taking value 1 if r is female, 0 otherwise GSS
edu<12 dummy variable taking value 1 if r has less than 12 GSS
years of schooling, 0 otherwise GSS
edu>16 dummy variable taking value 1 if r has more than 16 GSS
years of schooling, 0 otherwise GSS
educavg yearly regional average years of education GSS
married dummy variable taking value 1 if r is married, 0 GSS
otherwise
single dummy variable taking value 1 if r is single, 0 GSS
otherwise
ft dummy variable taking value 1 if r works full-time, GSS
0 otherwise
pt dummy variable taking value 1 if r works part-time, GSS
0 otherwise
Black/ dummy variable taking value 1 if r is Black or GSS
Afro-A. Afro-American, 0 otherwise
Other race dummy variable taking value 1 if r’s is other than GSS
Afro-A. or White, 0 otherwise GSS
Protestant dummy variable taking value 1 if r is Protestant, 0 GSS
otherwise
Catholic dummy variable taking value 1 if r is Catholic, 0 GSS
otherwise
Jews dummy variable taking value 1 if r is Jew, 0 otherwise GSS
Other religion dummy variable taking value 1 if r’s religion GSS
is other than Protestantism Catholicism or Judaism,
0 otherwise
2000 dummy variable taking value 1 for years 2000-2012, GSS
0 otherwise
dtr difference in trustworthiness between host region GSS,
and home country computed using the yearly average WVS
trust on both the host region and home country
trustavg yearly average trust of all the r living in a region
trustimmig yearly average trust of r immigrants living in a region GSS
trustworld yearly average trust of r immigrants living in a region GSS
coming from the same geographic area of the world
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Table A2 reports the estimation results on the whole sample using actual
data.
Table A2: Regression Results: Actual Data and Global Social Interactions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age 0.01 (0.013) -0.00 (0.009) 0.00 (0.007)
age2 -0.00 (0.000) 0.00 (0.000) -0.00 (0.000)
female -0.15** (0.072) 0.03 (0.046) -0.05 (0.038)
edu<12 0.05 (0.068) -0.13** (0.056) -0.14*** (0.051)
edu>16 0.05 (0.082) 0.22*** (0.058) 0.21*** (0.049)
educavg 1.01*** (0.186) -0.05 (0.062) -0.05 (0.045)
married 0.08 (0.080) 0.10* (0.058) 0.04 (0.047)
single 0.13 (0.102) 0.13 (0.082) -0.04 (0.065)
ft -0.24*** (0.087) 0.12** (0.057) 0.01 (0.046)
pt -0.15 (0.104) 0.11 (0.079) 0.11* (0.058)
Black -0.10 (0.143) -0.01 (0.096) -0.04 (0.087)
other race 0.21*** (0.067) -0.08* (0.050) -0.03 (0.039)
Protestant -0.03 (0.102) -0.08 (0.074) 0.03 (0.054)
Catholic -0.17* (0.098) -0.15** (0.074) -0.07 (0.054)
Jews -0.36 (0.266) -0.17 (0.153) 0.02 (0.124)
other religion -0.25** (0.118) -0.01 (0.083) 0.00 (0.064)
2000 1.53*** (0.183) 0.07 (0.056) -0.03 (0.040)
difftrust 0.53* (0.276) -0.55*** (0.213) -0.37*** (0.137)
trustavg 45.37*** (6.136) 0.96 (0.625) 0.58 (0.401)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 1,307
log-pseudol -811.30
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for respectively immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions and their behavioral decision in H-type regions; columns
(2), (4) and (6) report the standard errors (in parenthesis) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the Delta Method and are robust to heteroskedas-
ticity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at
the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2012.
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B Appendix II
Following the theoretical literature of social capital, social interactions and
neighbourhood effects models (e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001a, 2002, 2006,
2007; Durlauf, 2002; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005) and its theoretical ad-
vances (e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2006; Zanella, 2007), the work is grounded
on a theoretical model of social interactions with endogenous group mem-
bership. Immigrants coming from various areas of the world choose which
US region to join and a subsequent behavior, according to the following
regression tree:
Figure 1: Individual Decision Tree
The first stage represents the location decision, where immigrants choose
a group/region (location decision) of the United States g ∈ (L,H), defined
as L-type or H-type regions. The second stage decision is the behavioral
decision, ω ∈ (Liω|g, Hiω|g), where immigrants, after joining a region, decide
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whether to trust others.8
Immigrants, who are assumed to be rational, want to maximize their
utility function, V , as follows:
Max
g,ω
Vi (g, ω) (1B)
and they do this by first maximizing the decision of the region they decide
to join (g) and subsequently by maximizing their behavior conditional to
the location they joined (ωi|g).
In each decision they choose outcome 1 only if:
V (1)− V (−1) > 0 (2B)
that is, they decide to migrate for instance to an H-type region {1} if the
expected payoff they get from joining an H-type region is greater than the
expected payoff they get from joining an L-type region {-1}; similarly, they
decide to trust others if the payoff they get (conditional on their location
decision) from trusting others {1} is higher than the payoff they would get
if they had to decide not to trust others {-1}.
Also, both the location and the behavioral decision are a function of
private utility as well as social utility, so that the utility function can be
modeled as follows:
Vi (g, ω) = ν (g, ω, hi) + s
(
g, ω,meig
)
+ u(uig, uigω) (3B)
8Although the trust question may capture actual beliefs it is common, in the cultural
economics literature and when using survey questions, to assume that individuals are
rational and behave according to their beliefs. Thus, we can assume that ω captures
actual behavior of immigrants. Furthermore, although immigrants are born and come
from economies worldwide, they have been interviewed while they were already living in
the United States. So, it is reasonable to assume the absence of substantial differences
in the interpretation of the trust question that could be otherwise addressed using al-
ternative strategies (e.g. vignettes, see for instance King and Wand (2007)). However,
possible further heterogeneity is accounted in the model by allowing for the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity.
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where ν (·) indicates the deterministic private utility, u (·) indicates the
random private utility and s (·) indicates social utility. Social interac-
tions models (e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2006; Zanella, 2007) assume that
hi = c+ β
′
1Xi + β
′
2Yig, where c is a constant term, Xi represent individual-
specific characteristics and Yig group/region-specific characteristics. Jgm
e
ig
represent the social interactions term (meig) and the parameter that mea-
sures its strength (Jg).
I use the “proportional spillovers” specification of social utility that
implies that if an individual expects that most of the individuals in a group
will choose ω = 1, then the individual has an incentive to conform to the
choice of the majority (see Brock and Durlauf, 2001b and Zanella, 2007 for
details).
Finally, following Brock and Durlauf (2001b), I assume that in the model
multiple equilbria may arise when J > 1 and hi is homogeneous, and this
is a baseline of interest.
This theoretical framework leads to the estimation of the sequential logit
model defined in equations (1)-(3). Indeed, the maximization of the utility
function is represented by the following optimizations:
gi = arg max
g
(hi + Jm
e
ig + uig) (4B)
and
ωi = arg max
ω
(hiω + Jgm
e
iωg + uiωg) (5B)
sequentially taken by the immigrants, which lead to the estimation of the
following sequential logit structure:
pig =
exp(hi + Jm
e
ig)
exp(hiH + JmeiH) + exp(hiL + Jm
e
iL)
(6B)
and
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piω|g =
exp(hi + Jgm
e
iωg|g)
exp(hiω|H + Jgmeiω|H) + exp(hiω|L + Jgm
e
iω|L)
. (7B)
Assuming that h = β0+β
′
1Xi+β
′
2Yig+β
′
3dtrigr, equations (6B) and (7B)
are the probability associated, respectively, to equations (1) and (2)-(3).
This framework is suitable for the research question investigated in this
paper. Indeed, the location decision requires some degree of individual mo-
bility; while US natives could have also moved across US regions during
their life, the research question (the role of culture, both inherited and
contemporaneous, on individual decisions) is more appropriate to study a
sample of immigrants. Finally, I estimate the model using a sequential
logit rather than the nested logit (suggested for instance in Zanella, 2007).
Both the nested logit and the sequential logit can overcome the problems
typical of social interactions models. Indeed, the reflection problem (Man-
ski,1993), which refers to the impossibility, in linear-in-means models, to
identify and estimate the parameters of the model due to the co-movement
of the contextual effects and the social interactions term, is overcome using a
nonlinear estimator (e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001b); the self-selection prob-
lem, which arises because the model belongs to the neighborhood models,
where individuals endogenously choose their group membership, is solved,
as suggested by (Blume and Durlauf, 2006), by modeling self-selection and
taking into account the presence of endogenous sorting of individuals into
groups.
However, given the framework, it is more realistic to estimate the model
by means of a sequential logit rather than a nested logit model because we
can assume that it is too costly for the immigrants to get full information
at the first stage about the second stage maximization (see for instance
Nagakura and Kobayashi, 2009).
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